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Case No. 8074

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

,STATE \OF UTAH
LORETTA E.ARLE·Y, for herself and
on behalf of JoANNE L. MciN~TYRE, S·HARON MciNTYRE and
·CAROL MciNTYRE., minor chil'dren of JACK J. MciNT·YRE,
DEC'EAS,ED,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, T. K. PYM, doing business
as CERTIFIED DECTECTIVE
AGE.NC;Y and CONTINENTAL
c:ASUALTY C.OMPANY,
Deferndants.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LORETTA EARLEY, for herself
and on behalf of JoANNE L. McINTYRE, SHARON MciNTYRE and
CAROL MciNTYRE, minor children
of JACK J. MciNTYRE, DECEASED,
Plaintiffs,
c·ase No. 8074

-vs.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, T. K. PYM, doing business
as CERTIFIED DETECTIVE
AGENCY ~d CONTINENTAL
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendants.

D·EF:ENDANTS·' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF' FACTS
On September 24, 1951, a person signing himself "J.
1fclntyre" applied for and obtained employment with the
defendant T. K. Pym, doing business as Certified Detective Agency. In his application for employment he
listed himself as single, divorced, with no children, and
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stated that his father and mother \vere deceased, and that
he had no brother or sister (R. 50). That person wa~
killed in the course of his employment Septe1nber 29,
1951, four days later (R. 21, 22).
The applicant and plaintiff, Loretta Earley, wa~
1narried to Jack James Mcintyre February 9·, 1937 in
Reno, Nevada (R. 59), and as issue of this marriage there
were born three children, JoAnne, born August 28, 1943,
Sharon, born March 17, 1947, and Carol, born February
9, 1948, all at Napa, California (R. 56-58, 33). The correct name of the man married by Mrs. Earley as Jack
James Mcintyre was Jesse Eugene Connover (R. 37).
Why he went under the assumed name does not appear
from the record.
Mrs. Earley claims that J. Mcintyre employed by
T. K. Pym and her husband were one and the same person. The only information she has that her husband is
dead is that some ashes from a supposed cremation of a
body were sent to Napa and her husband's father told her
that they were the ashes of her husband and that he was
dead, but the death certificate supposed to be the certificate for the cremated body states that the date of death
of Jack James Mcintyre was September 9, 1951 (R. 39,
63, 46 and 47). Various photographs were offered and
identified by Mrs. Earley as pictures of her husband and
she also stated that the signature on the application for
employment was her husband's signature, and that the
reason it is different than the one on the application for
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her marriage license in Reno in 1937 ( R. 61) is because
he \vas in a hurry when he signed the application for employment (R. 43). How she knows this does not appear
from the record.
For the last ten years of her marriage to Mcintyre
Mrs. Earley lived with him in Napa, California (R·. 43).
On May 1, 1951, Mcintyre left her and she never SR\V him
again. A month later or on June 1, 1951, her attorney in
Napa, California, filed an action seeking a divorce from
Mcintyre on her behalf on the grounds of desertion (R.
39, 40). She never heard fro1n him againt except once
from R,eno when he wrote asking her to send him some
1nechanics and carpenter tools, and instead of sending the
tools she wrote him concerning the divorce and never received an answer. After May 1, 1951 when Mcintyre left
home he never sent any support for her or the children
(R. 27, 34). Mrs. Earley is a trained psychiatric technician and employed in the County Hospital in Napa, California from December, 1950 continuously, and was still
so ernployed at the time of the hearing before the Utah
Industrial Commission (R. 35-38). She started in at a
salary of $180.00 a month and at the time of the hearing
she \vas making $220.00 a month. She and Mcintyre together supported the family after her employment and
until he left home, and after he left home and until her
remarriage to Mr. Earley, she supported herself and the
children, and since her marriage to Earley she and
Earley are supporting herself and the children (R. 37-

39).
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Mcintyre's mother asserted that before the re1nains
were sent to Napa the wife remarried. Mrs. Earley was
not positive of this because she did not ren1e1nber the
burial date (R. 37), but she did marry Earley October 13,
1951 in Napa, California, about two weeks after September 29 when she claims her husband was killed (R. 36,
62).
So far as the record discloses she made no effort
to contact her husband, made no demands upon him for
support for herself or children, and adequately supported
the children and herself. There is no evidence whatever
that either she or the children received, or e;xpected to
receive, or needed to receive any financial help or assistance from her absent husband. So far as is disclosed by
the record, Mrs. Earley adequately supported herself and
the children from May 1, 1951 until her marriage to
Earley, and since that time she and Earley are supporting the children and herself. Mcintyre, her former husband, just disappeared from her life, and so far as appears from the record she was content to allow him to
do so, and never sought any support from him, even in
her attempted divorce case.
ARGUMENT
Before the Industrial Commission defendants, Pym
and Continental c·asualty Company, took the position
that the person employed by Pym was not the husband
or father of the applicants, and that in any event they
were not his dependents at the time of his death.
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The record is not very satisfactory. The death certificate sho,vs a death September 9, 1951, fifteen ( 15)
days before the en1ployee went to work for us. The applicant, Loretta Earley, doesn't even know that her husband is dead except that she received some of his personal effects and some ashes, supported by the death certificate stating death occurred September 9, which were
buried at Napa, California, presumably as those of her
husband. It does not appear how the deceased's father
learned of his death or ho'v anyone knew that the person
killed and cremated in South Dakota was or could be
identified as Loretta Earley's former husband. Certainly
no one learned of it through us because we didn't know
that our employee was ma.rried or had a father or mother
or any children. He was hired by us as a single man without any dependents or relatives of any kind. He was
with another of our employees at the time of his accident
and so far as we kno'v this employee knows no more about
him than we did. His widow says she had no knowledge
of his whereabouts and yet promptly the deceased's ashes
are sent to her at Napa, California, when neither we nor
his associate at the time of his death knew anything about
his Napa background.
Likewise, the record is silent as to why Mcintyre left
home apparently for no reason after fifteen (15) years
of allegedly happy married life. His wife immediately
begins divorce upon the ground of desertion, not nonsupport, makes no effort to contact him, makes no demand upon him for support for herself or her children,
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apparently neither seeking nor desiring such support,
and hardly is the deceased cold in his grave, and probably even before his ashes are received at Napa, she marries a man employed at the place where she is working and
has been working for five ( 5) months prior to the departure of the deceased from his home. The question naturally arises as to 'vhether or not Mr. Earley was the
cause of Meintyre's leaving horne, and the reason why
Mrs. Mcintyre was content to let him go and sought no
support from him. In any event, by bringing her divorce
action one month after Mcintyre left home and by remarrying probably even before his supposed ashes
reached Napa, she clearlyindicated that she was through
with Mcintyre and that Earley had replaced him in the
lives of herself and her children. The record is clear and
without dispute that neither she nor the children depended on Mcintyre or expected anything from him after
May 1, 1951. The record is also clear that prior to May
1, 19'51, and at least from the preceding December, she
and the children were at least partially supported by
her on earnings from the Napa County Hospital.
In this state of the record, the Industrial Commission
found that our deceased employee was the former husband of Loretta Earley and the father of the minor applicants. How it could do so with the death certificate
reading September 9, 1951, fifteen C15) days prior to the
employment of Mcintyre by us is unexplained. The
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Commission also found that there was no actual dependency upon Mcintyre by either Mrs. Earley or her children.
Assuming that the law of California is the same as
the law in Utah as to the obligation for support, we contend that the Industrial Commission is right, and that
applicants were not dependents of our employee at any
time during his employment by us.
In September of 1951, Section 42-1-67, U. C. A.
1943, was in effect. It is identical with the present Section 35-1-71 UCA, 1953, and provides as follows:
"The following persons shall be presumed to
be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased
employee:
(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she
lives at the time of his death.
(2) Children under the age of eighteen years
or over such age, if physically or mentally incapacitated, upon the parent, with whom they are
living at the time of the death of such parent, or
who is legally bound for their support.
"In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in
accordance vvi th the facts in each particular case
existing at the time of the injury resulting in the
death of such ernployee, but no person shall be
considered as dependent unless he is a member of
the fami]y of the deceased employee, or bears to
him the relation of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister. The word
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'child' as used in this title shall include a posthulnous child, and a child legally adopted prior to
the injury. Half brothers and half sisters shall
be included in the words 'brother or sister' as
above used."
Plaintiffs apparently make the contention that Subdivis~on (1) is not exclusive, and that a wife '\vho is not
living with her husband at the time of his death may be
sho'\vn to be a dependent, but that paragraph (2) is e;xclusive, and that children are dependents of the parent
'\vho is legally bound for their support regardless of the
facts. As we read the statute and under the interpretations given it by this court, neither '(1) nor (2) is exclusive or conclusive.
A presumption either of fact or law, is always rebuttable. Buhler v. Mad:dison, 105 U. 39, 140 P. 2d, 933,
109 U. 245, 166 P. 2d, 205. Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83
Utah 420, 29 P. (2) 355. By using the word "presumed"
in the statute, without the word "conclusive," the legislature merely made it unnecessary for an applicant to
offer proof as to children under 18 years of age, except
the fact that the parent legally bound for their support
was killed or injured by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment. That fact alone is sufficient
in the absence of any other evidence to allow a recovery.
However, the presumption, as in the presumption of sanity or innocence or title to real estate, whether it be one
of law or fact, is always rebuttable.
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In the case of People v. Fitzgerald, 58 P. 2d 718, the
California Court points out that under the code of civil
procedure a presumption not declared by law to be
conclusive may be controverted by other evidence. See
also Honrath v. New York L. Ins. Co., 275 N.W. 258 (N.
D.) S.o far as we know the law is uniform.
Plaintiffs in their Brief cite an Idaho Case, Larson

v. Independent School Di.strict, 22 P. 2d 299, which illustrates the significance of the distinction between our statute and Idaho. The Idaho Statute says: "The following
persons and they only shall be deemed dependents." No
other persons are dependents, and by the use of the word
"deemed" instead of "presumed", the Idaho Legislature
created a conclusive presumption. To this effect is the
California case of Irwin v. Pickwick Stages System., 25
P. 2d, 998, where the California Court said that a conclusive presumption is created by the words "shall be
deemed".
Our Legislature did not use the word "deemed", but
used the word "presumed", so that while the Idaho Statute means conclusively presumed, our statute permits the
presumption to be rebutted.
We have found no decision in this court holding or
even implying that the presumption of dependency is
conclusive and not rebuttable.
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In the case of Campton v. Industrial Commission of
Ut.ah, 106 U. 571, 151 P. 2d 189, cited by plaintiffs, Judge
Larson did say in his concurring opinion that he thought
that these presumptions of dependency "are not rebuttable, and the defense cannot be made that the husband
or father did not in fact support them and thus escape
the statutory payments." He, however, was the only
Judge who even intimated that the presumption was not
rebuttable. The decision itself in effect rebuts the presumption. In that case the father of the minor children
was alive. No effort was made to require him to support them, although he was legally bound to do so. The
children were members of the family of a man not their
father with whom their mother was living at the time he
was killed. c·ontrary to the claim of the applicants in this
case that Subdivision (2) of the statute is exclusive, this
court held that the children might recover under the last
paragraph of the statute as members of the family of
Campton regardless of the fact that they had living a
father who was legally bound for their support. So actually the presumption was rebutted, and the way was
open for a recovery against one not the father of the
dependents. In its effect, that case is squarely against
each of the contentions of the plaintiffs here. The presumption was rebutted and a recovery was allowed
against someone other than the person legally bound for
the support of the children.
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We have no quarrel with any of the cases cited by
the plaintiffs. Those from other states are controlled by
their statutes and decisions. We have indicated in the
case of Idaho there is a difference from our own. In addition to the Can1pton case, the plaintiff cites

Diaz v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 80 U.
77, '13 P. 2d, 307;
Hancock v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 58 Utah
192, 198 Pac. 169·;
Jones v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. (Ky.) 209
Ky. 643, 273, S.W. 494;
Larson v. Independent School
(Idaho) 22 Pac. (2d) 299;

District

Llewelyn v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 202
Pac. (2d) 160;
McGarry v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 53 Ut.
81, 222 Pac. 592;
McGarry v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 64 Ut.
592·, 23 2 Pac. 1090;
1

Nordmark v. Indian Queen Hotel (Pa.) 104
Pa. Super. 139, 159 A. 200;
Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 80 Ut.
301, 15 Pac. ( 2d) 297 ;
Utah Galena Corp. v. Industrial Comm.
(Utah) 78 Ut. 495, 5 Pac. (2d) 242·;
Wilson v. Hill, (Del. Super) 71 A. 2'd 425.
The Diaz case has no application here. As pointed
out by Judge Wolfe in Llew·elyn v. Industrial Com.mission, supra, cited by plaintiffs:
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"The case of Diaz et al. v. Industrial Cotntni~
sion, 80 Utah 77, 13 P. 2d 307, is not in point.
While there was ample evidence of dependency,
even though the husband and wife lived apart because of conditions other than any revealed fault
of either spouse, the case was decided on the
ground that the husband's death by pneun1onia
was not due to any injury received in his employment. Therefore, the discussion by Mr. ,J usti<'e
·straup on the question as to whether under the
facts there was dependency was dicta.. "
In the Llewelyn case all this court did was to say
that an award to a wife for separate maintenance indicated dependency even though the husband had not paid
the award. No such situation is present in the case at
bar.
We have no objection to the definition of "dependency" from the case of Hancock v. Industrial Commissi'on, supra. However this court in another case cited by
plaintiffs, Utah Galena Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra, quotes from Honnold, Workmen's Compensation, a more complete· definition as follows:
"It may be said in general terms that a 'dependent' is one who looks to another for support,
one dep·endent upon another for the ordinary necessities of life for a person of his class and position " * * *

'

"It follows that dependency does not depend
on whether the alleged dependents could support
themselves without decedent's earnings, or so re-
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duce their expenses so that they would be supported independent of his earnings, but on whether
they were in fact supported in whole or in part by
such earnings, under circumstances indicating an
intent on the part of the deceased to furnish such
support."
The same case quoted from 28 R.C.L. pages 770 and
771 as follows :
"As a very general proposition it may be said
that a dependent is one who looked to or relied
on the decedent for support and maintenance. Reliance must have been placed upon the deceased
employee to provide the applicant for compensation, in some measure or to some extent, with
his or her future living expenses. * * * The purpose of the statute is to provide the workman's dependent in future with something in substitution
for what has been lost by the workman's death,
and, consequently, to establish dependency the applicant for compensation must show that he or she
had reasonable grounds to anticipate future support from the decedent. This reasonable e~p·ecta
tion of continuing or future support and maintenance seems to be the true criterion as to who are
dependents."
In the Galena case there was actual proof of dependency on the part of the minors sufficient to sustain an
award in their favor.
The two McGarry cases both denied compensation.
The first one because there were no facts showing dependency and the second because of procedural matters.
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In the case at bar, the presumption of dependency
is eliminated by the testimony of Mrs. Earley herself.
Not only was there no reasonable expectation of continuing or future sup·port, but her evidence shows that neither
she nor the children lost anything by reason of the death
of Mcintyre. There is no evidence that they had any reasonable ground to expect future support. In fact; the
evidence is all the other way; that so far as they were
concerned he had passed out of their lives. Nor would it
serve any purpose of the compensation law to 1nake an
award against us in this case. None of the applicants lost
anything by reason of the employment of Mcintyre by us.
We employed him as a single man. At that time he was.
completely out of touch with his family, furnishing them
no support, and they were expecting none from him. Apparently another (Earley) had taken his place. The expeditiousness with which the former Mrs. l\!clntyre married Earley indicates a close prior association. Mcintyre
was only employed by us for four days. We didn't take
anything away from his -wife or children. Any value
he was to them was lost before he came to work for us.
In the case of Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission, supra, c.ompensation was denied. The court
through Judge Folland uses this language:
"There is no proof that deceased had contributed anything to the support of the minors since
the separation from his wife, and there is no competent evidence in the record as to the financial
condition of the minors or their mother nor how
or by whom they had been supported."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
In the case at bar there is competent evidence in the
record that neither the wife nor the children relied upon
the deceased for support at the time of his death, and
there is evidence in the record as to how they were supported. So far as the record shows all of them were
amply supported without any contributions frorn the deceased.
Judge F'olland further in the opinion says:
"There is, however, in evidence not anything
shown on which to rest a finding that this right
(of support) is of practical value or that it is reasonably probable that the obligation of the father
would be fulfilled. The mere fact that the father
is legally and morally bound to supp,ort his children does not necessarily establish that they were
partly or wholly dependent on him.." (Italics
added)
After that case our statute was amended so that
proof of the relationship alone would eliminate the necessity of the applicant supplying further proof to make
a prima facie case, but when the applicant herself establishes that there is no dependency in fact, those facts
overcome the presumption and there is no course other
than to deny compensation.
The plaintiffs assert that even if our statute is not
conclusive the record compels a finding of dependency
both for the wife and the children. As we have already
pointed out to establish dependency, absent the presumption, there must be a reasonable expectation of support
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either upon legal or moral grounds or from past experience. · There is not a word of evidence in this record that
either the wife or her children ever looked to the deceased
for future support or expected any from hiin. He had
passed completely out of their lives until Mrs. Earley
supposed she saw an opportunity to secure compensation
on account of the death of the deceased. She is looking
to herself and Earley for support of herself and the children and she neither sought nor expected any support
from Mcintyre.
The very fact that Mrs. Earley and Mcintyre had
lived together for 15 years and then without any given
reason he picks up and leaves, she immediately files for a
divorce on the· ground of desertion, and most expeditiously after his supposed death enters into a marriage with
Earley with whom she has been employed for a period before the departure of her husband, and that she makes
no effort whatever to hold her husband to his legal responsibilities, at least indicates a reason for her hasty
remarriage and her failure to assert heT rights against
Mcintyre.
Upon the record in this case there could not even
have been an award for partial dependency. There is no
evidence at all that the children or the wife were expecting or needed anything from Mcintyre. If there could be
no award for partial dependency, of course, there could
be no award for total dependency.
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CONCLUSION
It appears to us that even if it can be asserted that
our employee was the husband of Mrs. Earley and the
father of her children, in spite of the unsatisfactory record and the unexplained death certificate, that the record
also shows beyond a doubt that neither Mrs. Earley nor
her children were actual or legal dependents of our employee at the time of his employment or at the time of his
death. The Industrial Commission should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
PE.TER M. LOWE
Deputy Attorney General
SHIR.LEY P. JONES.
SHIRLEY P. JONE·s, JR.
Attorneys for Defendarnts
411 Utah Oil Building
S'alt Lake City 1, Utah
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